THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1986

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Dear Mr. Casey:

STAT

A mutual friend of ours, [redacted] wanted to be sure that you saw these.

Sincerely,

Ben Elliott

Ben Elliott

DCI
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New York Times
5·13·86

Bad News from Afghanistan

By Marvin Zonis

CHICAGO

There are two ways to read the news from Afghanistan. One way is to understand the "resignation" of the Soviet puppet, Babrak Karmal, as an indication that the Russians are preparing to distance themselves from the internal affairs of Afghanistan in preparation for a political settlement and a withdrawal of troops. The second interpretation, which is far less promising for Western interests, suggests that the Russians are poised on the brink of a major effort to eliminate, once and for all, the resistance of the Islamic guerrillas. Afghanistan could then be integrated into the Soviet empire and Moscow could turn its attention to new targets of opportunity. At the moment, at least, this more dire interpretation seems by far the more likely.

Consider the recent news from Afghanistan. Most dramatic is the replacement, eight days ago, of Babrak Karmal by a man called Najibullah — like others of the Pushtu tribe in Afghanistan and Pakistan, he has but one name — a 39-year-old former head of Khad, the Afghan secret police. He is a dedicated Commmunist, known to Afghans as "The Ox" because of his predilection for physical solutions to complex political problems, and was not averse to using Khad to eliminate opposition to the Soviet occupation.

But Najibullah is far more than a mere thug. He also devised a very successful policy to erode support for the guerrillas through bribery and the fomenting of rivalries both within and among the tribes of mountain people on whom the fighters rely. There is every reason to assume that his elevation to a top post in the Communist Party will result in more vigorous harassment of the guerrillas and a more sophisticated effort to build popular support for the regime.

A second piece of relevant news originates in Geneva, where indirect talks have resumed between the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The talks remain indirect because the Government of Pakistan refuses to recognize the Communist regime in Kabul, but a mediator shuttles between the hotel suites of the two delegations, and they in turn report indirectly to Washington and Moscow. The two sides have resolved virtually all outstanding issues with the exception of one — the most important — the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces.

Why was a new leader chosen?

The appointment of Najibullah coincided with the resumption of talks and was interpreted as a signal that Moscow intended to show some flexibility in the negotiations. By eliminating the "stoolie" whom they had installed in Kabul at gunpoint in 1979, the Russians, it was said, were indicating their openness to new solutions. In truth, however, Najibullah is anything but flexible, and it seems unlikely that his appointment was intended to signal any kind of thaw.

What happens in Afghanistan will also be influenced by the return to Pakistan of Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, executed in 1979 by President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq. With the lifting of martial law and the opening of the political process, Miss Bhutto has returned to vindicate the memory of her father by ousting President Zia. She has taken no direct position on the Afghan civil war but has criticized Pakistan's close alignment with the United States and questioned the value of serving as an "agent" of Washington.

Miss Bhutto is a long way from her goal, but if she were to oust General Zia, she would surely seek a more "neutral" stance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Pakistan would no longer serve as an open conduit for American arms going to the Afghan guerrillas, and Islamabad would undoubtedly exercise tighter control over the political and military activities of the more than three million Afghan guerrillas who have made their headquarters in Pakistan.

What would this mean for the United States? Iran is the only other country that could supply the guerrillas and provide a haven for their operations. But without a dramatic shift of power in Teheran, Iran is obviously unlikely to facilitate American support for the guerrillas. (Quite apart from the American connection, the Iranians have been generally unhelpful to the guerrillas — for although the insurgent cause is very much inspired by Islam, most of the Afghan fighters are Sunni rather than Shiite Moslems.)

In an effort to convince Pakistanis of the danger of continuing to serve as a conduit for American arms and as a place of refuge for the guerrillas, the Russians have recently stepped up their raids across the Afghan-Pakistani border. Soviet agents also seem to be active in northwestern Pakistan, stirring up hatred against the refugees there. They appear to have had some success in alarming people about the costs of sheltering the refugees — the financial cost, the disruption to Pakistani society and the military risk that follows from allowing the refugees to maintain their bases in Pakistan — and, as a result, Miss Bhutto's foreign policy pronouncements are increasingly well received.

Expect a new military offensive

This is, to be sure, a rather awkward moment for Moscow to escalate its efforts in central Asia. The failing Soviet economy requires all the attention that Mikhail S. Gorbachev can muster. The nuclear disaster at Chernobyl is a further preoccupation, focusing Moscow's concern on the Soviet nuclear power industry and on damaged relations with Western Europe. The last thing the Kremlin needs now is more trouble on its southern flank.

The appointment of Najibullah seems, nevertheless, to be part of an ever more complex Soviet game in central Asia. Given his appointment, the talks in Geneva seem more of a public-relations venture rather than a step toward a genuine resolution. Far more likely now is a political and military offensive on the ground in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is, sadly, the most plausible way to read the appointment of Najibullah.□

Marvin Zonis, chairman of the committee on human development at the University of Chicago, writes frequently on Middle Eastern politics.

THE WASHINGTON POST - May 11, 1986

Jeane Kirkpatrick

Nicaragua and Libya: Partners in Terror

Maybe knowing about Nicaragua's Libyan connection will help the U.S. Congress and others understand the nature of the Sandinista government and why developments in that country are important to the peace and security of the hemisphere. Governments, as with people, can be known by their friends. The ties between rulers of those nations were reaffirmed last week when Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega communicated with Libya's Muammar Qaddafi.

"My brother, given the brutal terrorist action launched by the U.S. government against the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah, I wish to send sentiments and solidarity from the FSLN National Directorate and the Nicaraguan people and government. . . ," he said.

"It is not the first time leaders of Libya and Nicaragua have sworn eternal friendship. They have been working together for more than a decade. Years before they came to power—in July 1979—Sandinista leaders trained in PLO camps in Libya and Lebanon. Strong bonds were forged with the Middle Eastern terror network, and those bonds were reinforced when the Sandinistas seised the government of Nicaragua. Qaddafi then pledged political and financial aid and has made good on his promise.

"Our friendship with Libya is eternal," said Sandinista commander Tomas Borge on Sept. 1, 1984.

Another member of the Nicaraguan junta, Sergio Ramires, testified that "The solidarity of the Libyan people, of the Libyan government and comrade Muammar Qaddafi was always patently manifest. This solidarity has been made real, has been made effective, has been made more fraternal since the triumph of our revolution."

Sandinistas received a $100 million "loan" from Libya in the early years, and last year signed a trade agreement that exchanges Libyan oil for Nicaraguan bananas and coffee. The world got a look at another dimension of the relationship in April 1983, when Brazilian authorities inspected four Libyan planes bound for Nicaragua and found that crates marked "medical supplies" contained 84 tons of military equipment—missiles, machine guns, bazookas, mortars, bombs, cannons and two unassembled fighter planes.

"Nicaragua is a wonderful thing," Qaddafi has emphasized. "They fight America on its own ground."

Most Americans have been reluctant to recognize the interconnections among terrorist groups, but those ties can no longer be denied. Neither can Sandinista links with Libya, the PLO and Iran, links which place Nicaragua in a network of violence that murders and maims from the Bekaa to Bogotá.

We prefer to think that violence originates in each country out of strictly indigenous problems and reflects indigenous hostilities. We prefer to think civil wars result from popular discontent and social injustice. We do not at all like the notion of international bands training together, working together, wreaking violence, and making revolution together. And yet, the reality of Nicaragua's training with the PLO, and Libya can no more be denied than the reality of Libyan economic, financial and military assistance for the Sandinistas.

Today resources from throughout the Soviet bloc aid in consolidating Sandinista power in Nicaragua and spreading violence in Central and South America. Managua has become the capital city of terrorism in the Western hemisphere.

Germany's Bader-Meinhoff gang, Spain's Basque ETA, Colombia's M19, Peru's Sendero Luminoso and El Salvador's FMLN meet with those of Libya and the PLO. Italian Premier Benito Craxi has publicly complained of the presence of fugitive Italian terrorists in Managua.

Nicaragua's support for Colombia's principal guerrilla group, M19, has been documented in some detail. M19 has offices in Managua, its members are honored guests at Sandinista functions, and they travel on Nicaraguan passports.

When an M19 group attacked Colombia's supreme court last December, more than 100 were left dead. Many of the guns captured in that raid were linked to Libya, Vietnam, Cuba and, of course, Nicaragua. Some of the rifles used in the raid had been sold by the Vietnamese to Libya, and from there were shipped to Nicaragua and then to the Colombian guerrilla movement. Sandinista army rifles (M-16s and R-16s) were also found at the scene.

Sandinistas directed preparation for the attack, which was modeled on their 1978 seizure of the parliament building in Managua. An FSLN commando group traveling on Colombian passports arrived in that country a day before the bloody occupation and coordinated it. Other Nicaraguans handled communications. And Tomas Borge himself eulogized the slain Colombian guerrillas at a "people's mass."

The Libyan link was also clear. Leading participants (for example, Diana Morales, who inflicted the most casualties on the military) had been trained in Libya, Nicaragua and Cuba.

These facts make the relevance of Nicaragua to U.S. security undeniable. Speaking after the American bombing of Libya, Borge commented, "Who has given the United States government the right to determine what is terrorism and what is not terrorism?" One might well ask instead: who has given the Nicaraguan government the right to spread violence in this hemisphere?

Congressmen and others who have been hoping for the best in Nicaragua are being confronted with new details of the Sandinista role in the international support system for violent politics.

The cost to Central America in loss of peace and freedom is already high. If the full consolidation of Sandinista power and the full incorporation of Nicaragua into the "world socialist system" is permitted, U.S. congressmen will look back with nostalgia on a time when $100 million in American aid to the contras could have made a real difference.

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

WPost 5/13/86

A Box Called Contadora

Angry voices were raised when House Republican leaders told Ambassador Philip Habib behind closed doors April 29 that his pursuit of the Contadora process was a sellout of the contras and would make the U.S. hostage to phantom Sandinista "reforms."

But President Reagan's Central American envoy reminded Minority Leader Bob Michel, Whip Trent Lott and other GOP leaders that he was only following Ronald Reagan's instructions: try your darndest for a political deal to democratise the communist regime in Nicaragua. "Habib was on solid ground, considering his orders," one hard-line anti-Sandinista Republican conceded to us.

That sums up the sudden ill health of the Reagan Doctrine in Central America. Insensibly, it has become a twin brother of the "containment" theory of some congressional Democrats who also rely on the good intentions of the communists in Managua. The odd men out are the contras.

Reagan's Hobson's choice: If President Daniel Ortega signs the Contadora agreement promising reforms, Reagan's repudiation of it would end any chance of congressional aid to the contras. But Reagan's acceptance would—according to Habib's written promise—disband the contras; Ortega would be free to tear up the agreement at his leisure with no risk of contra reprisal.

Habib was summoned by the House Republican leaders to Michel's H-227 Capitol hideaway for a warning. Despite tough questioning by Reps. Dick Cheney and Jack Kemp among others, Habib did not give an inch.

But the way the administration has played its muddled anti-Sandinista hand leaves little room for any change at this late date. Reports are circulating here that despite a cleavage in the Marxist regime on whether to sign the elaborate but unenforceable Contadora agreement of last September, both Cuba's Fidel Castro and the Soviet Union are counseling Ortega to sign.

The agreement would clear the way for a long breathing space during which the Marxist-Leninist regime could build its power, stabilize its economy and get rid of remaining internal enemies—stripping away what few freedoms remain. Time would be provided to develop new means of exporting communism through Central America. The only U.S. policy is hope that the Sandinistas will stonewall.

How did Ronald Reagan get himself locked in this box, where the future of his Reagan Doctrine appears to lie in the hands of his Sandinista enemies? A partial answer is the difference in outlook between the president and the secretary of state he trusts and admires, George Shultz.

Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams, a neoconservative political appointee in charge of the Latin American bureau, shares Reagan's optimism about rolling back the boundaries of communism and expanding the frontiers of free societies. But by persuading Reagan to name retired diplomatic troubleshooter Habib as his chief guide through the Nicaraguan swamps, Shultz seized policy control.

This is the same Shultz-Habib team that drafted the failed U.S. policy in Lebanon, when the secretary overrode experienced Mideast advisers.

Perhaps partly because of Habib, State Department insiders say Shultz has no confidence in the contra solution for Nicaragua. During his unfriendly exchange with the House Republican leaders, Habib made no secret of the fact that he fears the contras will take the United States down a blind alley.

To congressional Reaganites, that tripe up the president at a critical point in his Latin policy. They argue that if Congress had voted funds for the contras at the time they showed military muscle in swamping the March 27 Sandinista incursion into Honduras, the anti-communist guerrillas could have proved their staying power and high morale.

Instead, it has been all downhill: congressional stalling over contra funds; organizational problems within the contras (Arturo Cruz, their most respected leader internationally, is expected to pull out soon); finally, Shultz's embrace of Contadora in his seminal Mexico City speech last July 26.

Some congressional Reaganites want language in the Contadora agreement to bind all Latin states as guarantors, with the United States, to ensure that the Sandinistas live up to their pledges. A more fanciful notion than an allied army marching on Managua to stamp out repression would be hard to find.

If Ortega signs, Reagan will either have to scramble to find some credible way out of Shultz's Mexico City pronouncement or let the Sandinistas have their run of Central America. Thus is the Reagan Doctrine reduced to hope—a hope that Ortega's revolutionary stubbornness will surmount good sense and prodding from Havana and Moscow.

GORDON HUMPHREY

Fears of an Afghan sellout

Peace talks on the Afghan war, under way again in Geneva, may soon bear bitter fruit. From all indications, the United Nations-sponsored talks are edging ever closer to a "settlement' which smells a lot more like a wholesale sellout of the Afghan resistance.

The most basic flaw in the talks is that they exclude legitimate representatives of the Afghan people. Here are talks which could decide the fate of the people of Afghanistan, and who is representing Afghanistan? The puppet regime set up in Kabul by the Soviets after their invasion in 1979 — an illegitimate regime that would fall in a matter of days without the protection of the Soviet armed forces.

Afghanistan is being represented by officials of the so-called "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan." The DRA regime is not democratic, and it does not represent the people of Afghanistan. Yet the DRA is there in Geneva, deciding the fate of the Afghan people.

In recent testimony before the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan, former U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick reminded us that President Reagan, in his speech to the U.N. General Assembly last year, outlined some basic standards which apply to negotiations such as these. The president said direct negotiations between the warring parties, in regional conflicts in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and Ethiopia, were a "starting point" of a peace process whose objective is internal reconciliation, with democracy and human rights for all.

The mujahideen are defending the frontier of freedom, practically with their bare hands. They are defending it not just for themselves, but for all the peoples of the world who love freedom. America sells out herself, as well as the Afghans, if we give them anything less than a fair shot.

That is the official position of the United States, as articulated by the president: *direct negotiations between the warring parties* is the starting point. But the U.N. negotiations on Afghanistan exclude one of the warring parties, the *mujahideen*, who have valiantly waged a six-year war against Soviet forces and have sacrificed monumentally in their effort to rid their nation of an invader and its puppet government.

An important principle is violated when the United States sanctions dishonestly structured talks such as these, and to encourage talks whic don't meet the minimum standar set by our president makes it appe that he is not serious in what he say

The president has been bad served by the State Departme which has given its blessing to the negotiations that do not meet the cr teria he laid down in his speech to th United Nations and which in D cember reversed the previous U position by offering to act as a "gua antor" of a settlement the fin terms of which are still unknown.

Actively encouraging — and o fering to guarantee — talks that ex clude any legitimate Afghan repre sentative is high-handed, arrogant and immoral.

The fate of nations being decide absent their legitimate representa tives is reminiscent of Yalta. It i past time that our government insis that the U.N. talks on Afghanista include the legitimate representa tives of the Afghan people, th *mujahideen*.

As to the terms, they appear to b a trap. The Soviets are insisting tha aid to the Afghan freedom fighte be cut off immediately, before an troop withdrawal. In addition, Pak stan must officially recognize th puppet regime in Kabul. Then, some point when the Soviets are sa isfied that all aid to the freedo fighters has been cut off, they sa they will withdraw their forces i stages.

It takes no vivid imagination t see how matters would play out: w and others would cut off aid to th freedom fighters. Pakistan woul recognize Moscow's puppet i Kabul. The Soviets would withdra

see HUMPHREY, page 2D

Gordon Humphrey is a Republican senator from New Hampshire and co-chairman of the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan.

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